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During the sixteenth century the Jesuits were the main providers of knowledge about
Asian lands. In addition to missionary activities, the Jesuits participated in a two-way
cultural exchange introducing European science and culture in general to Asian countries
and sending back to Europe news about unknown regions. This was not an open exchange,
as the missionaries censored secular ideas contrary to Catholic teachings. “Even so, the
Jesuits played a key bridging role in interpreting the Orient for European audiences and
seeking to change it through demonstrations of ‘superior’ cosmology” (p. 110). It is during
the prominence of Iberian powers in Asia that in addition to the coveted species, tea, porce-
lain, lacquerware, and other merchandise reached markets in Europe and America. In spite
of the prominence achieved by the Dutch in Asian waters in the seventeenth century and
the arrival of other European powers, “the church canon in Asia remained canonical until
breached by the scientific discoveries and knowledge gathered by the great Enlightenment-
era discoverers” (p. 110). During the eighteenth century China was admired due to “indus-
try, inventiveness, philosophical strengths, and cultural richness” (p. 146). Voltaire cele-
brated the Chinese system of government as an “enlightened despotism” that was criticized
by European intellectual after the French Revolution as an odious Oriental despotism. Marx
considered “Asian regions as not only despotic but also fossilized, incapable of progress
and offering obstacles to capitalist development” (p. 167). European imperialism and
negative views of Asian societies went hand in hand.
Geoffrey Gunn is right when he observes that without “schools, churches, presses, and
missionary activities, the circuits of commerce and trade reaching from Europe to Asia
could not have flourished”(p. 284). Nonetheless, the book’s central argument is highly
problematic: “Our thesis of Eurasian cultural metamorphoses restores Asia to its rightful
civilizational equivalence or even preeminence in an era before the rise of industrialism”
(p. 284), in light of his observations about the state of science and technology in Asia. In
China, according to Gunn, “intellectual involution appeared to be entrenched across the
Confucian world.” The Ottomans lacked technological know-how and “only Tokugawa
Japan came to emulate the spirit of Enlightenment inquiry”(p. 279). However, the Japanese,
in scientific terms, were far behind Americans and Europeans when Commodore Perry
arrived. The author does not address the reasons why the Japanese, the Chinese, and the
Ottomans did not have the technological edge that he attributes to “Enlightenment advances
in sciences and technology” (p. 279). It appears that in the Eurasian exchange, which is,
according to Gunn, the crucial intellectual arena in world history, the Europeans were able
to profit the most.
Many of the themes and ideas present in Gunn’s book have been addressed before in
detail by historians such as Donald F. Lach, Joseph Needham, Charles Boxer, and Jonathan
Spence. Lacking in the present volume, despite the diverse topics, regions, and time periods
covered, is a coherent intellectual synthesis of the material. Nonetheless, as an introduction
to the cultural exchanges in Eurasia, Gunn’s book is highly useful. 
ARTURO GIRALDEZ, University of the Pacific
Wirtschaftspolitik  nach  dem  Ende  der  Bretton-Woods-Ära.  “Jahrbuch  für
Wirtschaftsgeschichte.” 2002/1. Pp. 269. i64.80, paper.
This is a medley of essays on the political economy of transatlantic relationships in the
second half of the twentieth century, offered by a group of distinguished economists and
economic historians as a festschrift for the 60 years of their German peer, Carl-Ludwig
Holtfrerich. The Yearbook encompasses a variety of topics, among which a personal ac-
count of the rise of monetarism as a policy rule by Charles P. Kindleberger, a “wise and284 Book Reviews
witty” man (in Richard Sylla’s words) we already miss. However, the core issue at stake
is the scope for national sovereignty in a globally integrated economy—a world of “capital-
ism in many countries,”  writes Welf Werner in his final remarks (p. 249), as opposed to the
“socialism-in-many-countries” regime of Bretton Woods (a variation on Peter Temin’s
famous motto suggested by Knick Harley) (p. 157).
 A unifying theoretical background is provided by the analysis of twentieth-century
monetary regimes through the “trilemma,” the policy trade-off suggesting that a viable
international monetary regime has to give up at least one corner of an incompatible triad
formed by fixed exchange rates (sacrificed in the early 1920s as well as in the post–Bretton
Woods era), free capital mobility (renounced both in the 1930s and under Bretton Woods),
and domestic monetary policy discretion (which governments gave up during the Gold
Standard). As Harley emphasizes, however, both the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods
collapsed under the mounting pressure of the subordinated monetary goal—increasing
globalization and capital market integration in the case of the latter (p. 169). This is the
focus of Sylla’s contribution, which challenges the standard geopolitical account of the
breakdown of Bretton Woods by proposing an alternative story based on a reversed causal-
ity (p. 84). It was not, Sylla argues, the Cold War and its impact on U.S. fiscal and mone-
tary policies in the second half of the 1960s that undermined the viability of the system; it
was  rather  the  unprecedented  transnational  thrust  of  U.S.  banks,  escaping  from  an
overregulated domestic system—an issue addressed also by Randall S. Krosner in a paper
on the economics and politics of branching deregulation in the United States (p. 217)—and
following their multinational customers abroad, that sowed the seeds of the transition to the
post–Bretton Woods regime. 
Quite in the same vein, Richard Tilly surveys the rise of Euro currencies and international
capital markets to suggest that deregulation, liberalization, and market-oriented institutional
convergence, although triggered by the exogenous shock brought home by the United
States, were basically a reaction to the restrictive regulation of financial institutions that
prevailed after 1945 (p. 216). Indeed, Heiner Flassbeck suggests that political elites who
gave in to such powerful market forces were actually misled by the promise of increased
national sovereignty, in terms of insulation from international shocks, embedded in a flexi-
ble exchange regime. This, Flassbeck argues, was a fallacious “fiction” that spelt disaster
for international trade and financial stability (p. 33). Marcello De Cecco also espouses a
critical view of globalization in his learned historical excursus on the secular experience of
Europe with capital controls. He warns against the destabilizing potential of massive short-
term capital movements and cautions emerging countries against “following incautious
advice” to adopt “prematurely” capital account convertibility (p. 65). He is nevertheless
skeptical about the effectiveness of unilateral capital controls, and qualifies his open-mind
approach to Tobin’s “sand-in-the-wheel” argument by stressing the higher degree of inter-
national cohesion that multilateral regulation would require. 
The importance of international cooperation is also emphasized by Barry Eichengreen.
He raises the question whether in fact the explosive growth of international capital flows
of the late twentieth century made national economies alarmingly more vulnerable to
international contagion, relative to past periods. After modeling the channels through which
crises spread internationally, he empirically analyses the experience of 21 countries over
the period 1880–1998, and finds strong similarities between the post-1971 and the pre-1940
period as to frequency, incidence, and determinants of financial crises. At the same time,
the pre-1913 globalized system looms up as relatively stable, due to institutional character-
istics that reinforced the credibility of national authorities’ commitment to currency stabil-
ity, thus making globalization politically and socially viable (p. 102). This is a lesson from
a distant past that, Eichengreen regrets, political elites of nowadays might have to learn
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Harold James expresses the same concerns as to the politics of de-globalization. Can
redistributional conflicts or radicalized extremes, he asks, translate again into a backlash
against internationalization similar to the interwar one? He suggests that the highly frag-
mented political spectrum within Western democracies and the absence of any strong
national model of antiglobal success has so far prevented the pendulum from swinging back
from globality too fast (p.144). Nonetheless, he warns, the emergence of new populisms
based on “mild” protectionism against trade as well as capital and labor movements might
well drive us into the same mistakes that in the 1920s prepared the ground for the catastro-
phe of the following decade.
STEFANO BATTILOSSI, Universidad Carlos III Madrid
The World Economy and National Economies in the Interwar Slump. Edited by Theo
Balderston. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Pp xii, 226. $72.00.
This slim and eminently readable volume of essays provides an impressive coverage and
update on recent research on the causes and course of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
It  builds  on  the  substantial  and  authoritative  scholarship  already  deployed  by  Barry
Eichengreen and Peter Temin on the subject. It exhibits depth as well as breadth and offers
a panorama of the “chain reactions” set in motion by the initial and concomitant deflation-
ary shock in both core and periphery economies. Despite being obviously aimed at the
professional economist or economics-literate historian with a taste for monetary and finan-
cial questions, the approach is very reader friendly so as not to discourage the nonspecialists
(including this reviewer).
Although the editor has clearly given free rein to the contributors to recount the unfolding
of the slump in their area of expertise, what is affectionately labeled by the editor the “ET
(or Eichengreen-Temin) thesis” on the primacy of the deflationary transmission of the gold
standard provides the fil rouge of the quest for the underlying causes of the slump which
carried the West and the rest of the world into an unprecedented cataclysm. In an opening
chapter Balderston offers a clear and welcome exposition of the “propagation mechanism”
fostered by international monetary arrangements in setting off the worldwide depression.
He complements it with a chronological recounting of policy decisions and new estimates
on the distribution of gold money stocks before and in the course of the slump. In chapter
2, Pierre Siklos analyses the behavior of the Canadian economy during this period in rela-
tion to that of the United States. The immediate geographical proximity makes Canada a
prime example for testing the transmission through interest rates and capital flows mecha-
nism of the depression. After investigating the monetary and financial integration of the two
economies prior to the shock, he scrutinizes the business cycle(s) and price movements to
identify the primum mobile for the Canadian slump. In spite of institutional differences (no
central bank until 1935) and the Canadian dollar’s peg on the pound, the two economies
exhibit a strikingly similar behavior with regard to the slump’s timetable and subsequent
recovery. Begging to differ on the centrality of monetary forces’ thesis, the author con-
cludes that the identification of one single central cause should not detract from the investi-
gation of additional determinants that triggered “such a cataclysmic event.” The next major
player in the international gold standard system was of course France whose central bank,
along with the Fed, powerfully contributed to deflation by increasing its gold assets at the
turn of the 1930s. Pierre Villa (chapter 3) concentrates first on explaining why France
entered the depression as late as it did. Using a portfolio model he subsequently shows that
the same policy that helped stabilize the franc and foster gold inflows also accounts for
France being spared the full blow of the depression until 1931. He reasserts the primacy of